Emotions and the Optimality of Unfair Tournaments by Kräkel, Matthias
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 · www.gesy.uni-mannheim.de 
Universität Mannheim · Freie Universität Berlin · Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin · Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München 
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn · Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung Mannheim 
 
Speaker: Prof. Konrad Stahl, Ph.D. · Department of Economics · University of Mannheim · D-68131 Mannheim, 
Phone: +49(0621)1812786 · Fax: +49(0621)1812785 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
May 2005 
 
 
 
 
*Matthias Kräkel, Department of Economics, BWL II, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24-42, D-53113 Bonn, 
Germany, m.kraekel@uni-bonn.de   
 
 
 
Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through SFB/TR 15 is gratefully acknowledged.
Discussion Paper No. 45 
Emotions and the Optimality of 
Unfair Tournaments 
Matthias Kräkel*   
Emotions and the Optimality of Unfair Tournaments*
Matthias Kräkel, University of Bonn**
We introduce a concept of emotions that emerge when workers compare
their own performance with the performances of co-workers. Assuming het-
erogeneity among the workers the interplay of emotions and incentives is an-
alyzed within the framework of rank-order tournaments which are frequently
used in practice. Tournaments seem to be an appropriate starting point for
this concept because the main idea of a tournament is inducing incentives by
making workers compare themselves with their opponents. We differentiate
between exogenous and endogenous tournament prizes and identify certain
conditions under which the employer benefits from emotional workers. In this
case, he clearly prefers unfair to fair tournaments. Furthermore, the concept
of emotions is used to explain the puzzling findings on the oversupply of effort
in experimental tournaments.
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1 Introduction
Emotions are a natural ingredient of human beings. In particular, when
evaluating possible consequences of their decisions people take emotions like
anger, frustration, joy or pride into account. Hence, an economic decision
maker should also incorporate possible emotions into his objective function.
Moreover, the experimental findings of Bosman and van Winden (2002) on
emotional hazard point out that emotions play an important role in real de-
cision making. However, as Elster (1998) and Loewenstein (2000) complain,
economists — with some exceptions1 — do not pay attention to emotions when
modelling economic behavior although introducing emotions may ”help us ex-
plain behavior for which good explanations seem to be lacking” (Elster 1998,
p. 489).
In this paper, emotions are introduced into the theory of rank-order tour-
naments. In a (rank-order) tournament, at least two workers compete against
each other for given prizes. The worker with the best performance receives
the winner prize, the second best worker gets the second highest prize and
so on. There exist many examples for tournaments in economics.2 They can
be observed between salesmen (e.g., Mantrala et al. 2000), in broiler pro-
duction (Knoeber and Thurman 1994) and also in hierarchical firms when
people compete for job promotion (e.g., Baker et al. 1994, Eriksson 1999,
Bognanno 2001). Basically, corporate tournaments will always be created if
relative performance evaluation is linked to monetary consequences for the
employees. Hence, forced-ranking or forced-distribution systems, in which
1See, e.g., Hirshleifer (1987) on emotions as guarantors of threats and promises, Kandel
and Lazear (1992) on shame and guilt in the context of peer pressure, Mui (1995) on envy.
2For a theoretical analysis of tournaments see Lazear and Rosen (1981), Green and
Stokey (1983), Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983), Rosen (1986).
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supervisors have to rate their subordinates according to a given number of
different grades, also belong to the class of tournament incentive schemes
(see, for example, Murphy 1992 on forced ranking at Merck). Boyle (2001)
reports that about 25 per cent of the so-called Fortune 500 companies utilize
forced-ranking systems to tie pay to performance (e.g., Cisco Systems, Intel,
General Electric).
In the following, we will consider emotions that will emerge if workers
compare their own performance with the performances of co-workers. Typi-
cally, workers feel pride when outperforming their co-workers, whereas they
feel anger when falling behind them. Combining such concept of emotions
with the concept of rank-order tournaments seems somewhat natural because
contestants must compare themselves with their co-workers who compete in
the same tournament. Then a worker feels anger when losing against an op-
ponent and pride when winning against him. Similar to the notion of pride,
Fershtman, Hvide and Weiss (2003a, 2003b) consider a concept of so-called
competitive preferences in which a player derives utility from being ahead.
They apply their concept to standard individualistic incentive schemes. If
we applied this concept to tournaments, the subjective winner prize of each
contestant would be larger than the monetary winner prize irrespective of
whether workers are homogeneous or heterogeneous. Hence, under that con-
cept standard tournament results will qualitatively remain the same. One
would only have to redefine the given tournament prizes as subjective prizes.
However, in this paper, we assume that emotions that emerge when compar-
ing one’s own performance with the performance of co-workers will depend
on the type of co-worker. Emotions will be stronger if the workers are het-
erogeneous, since it will be more difficult to beat a more able co-worker than
an equally or less talented one. By combining emotions with heterogeneity
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among workers, we can derive conditions under which an employer prefers
heterogeneous departments — and hence unfair tournaments — to homoge-
neous ones — i.e. fair tournaments — and vice versa.
The aim of the paper is twofold: First, it will be emphasized that emo-
tions are not always detrimental as pointed out by the experiments on emo-
tional hazard and the model by Mui (1995) on envy. We can show under
which conditions emotions are beneficial for a profit maximizing employer.
In particular, the employer may even benefit from ”negative emotions” of his
workers like frustration or anger. Standard tournament results show that un-
fair tournaments between heterogeneous agents are never optimal. However,
when introducing emotions into tournaments this general result no longer
holds. On the contrary, equilibrium efforts may even increase in the ability
difference of the competitors.
Second, the paper seizes the suggestion made by Elster and utilizes emo-
tions to explain empirical findings that contradict standard economic theory.
There exist diverse experimental findings on asymmetric tournaments which
are puzzling as they show that players significantly oversupply effort com-
pared to equilibrium effort levels (Bull et al. 1987, Weigelt et al. 1989,
Schotter and Weigelt 1992). By using the concept of emotions these results
can easily be explained.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the model is
introduced. Section 3 introduces anger and pride into tournament theory in
order to focus on the central question under which conditions the employer
will prefer unfair tournaments to fair ones. Here we also differentiate between
situations in which tournament prizes are exogenously given, and situations
with endogenously chosen optimal tournament prizes. Section 4 discusses
the main findings. Section 5 concludes.
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2 The Model
We consider a firm which consists of one risk neutral employer and four risk
neutral workers.3 Each worker’s observable (but unverifiable) performance
or output can be described by the production function qi = ei + ai + εi (i =
1, 2, 3, 4).4 ei denotes endogenous effort which is chosen by worker i, ai worker
i’s exogenous ability and εi individual noise which is also assumed to be
exogenous. The noise variables ε1, ε2, ε3, ε4 are identically and independently
distributed with density g (·) and cumulative distribution function G (·). Let
f(·) denote the density and F (·) the cumulative distribution function of the
composed random variable εj − εi of each pair of two workers. It is assumed
that f(·) has a unique mode at zero.5 The employer can only observe realized
output qi but none of its components. Hence, a standard moral hazard
problem is considered. Exerting effort entails costs on a worker which are
described by the function c(ei) with c (0) = 0, c0(ei) > 0 and c00(ei) > 0. The
reservation value of each worker is u¯ ≥ 0.
Two of the workers — the so-called ”underdogs” — are characterized by
low ability aU , whereas the two other workers — the ”favorites” — have a high
ability aF with aF > aU .6 Let∆a := aF−aU > 0 denote the ability difference
3Most of the assumptions follow the standard tournament model by Lazear and Rosen
(1981). For the optimal design of unfair rent-seeking contests see Feess, Muehlheusser and
Walzl (2002).
4By assuming an observable but unverifiable performance signal we can exclude stan-
dard individualistic incentive schemes like piece rates which would not work in this context
whereas tournament incentives will still hold; see Malcomson (1984).
5For example, if εi and εj are uniformly distributed over [−ε¯, ε¯] (normally distributed),
the convolution f (·) will be a triangular distribution over [− 2ε¯, 2ε¯] (normal distribution)
with mean zero.
6Of course, heterogeneity between workers can be modelled in different ways. Here we
take the additive model of Meyer and Vickers (1997), Holmström (1999), Höffler and Sliwka
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between favorites and underdogs. The respective type U or F of each worker
is common knowledge.
It is assumed that the firm consists of two departments and that the
employer has to choose the composition of the departments. He can either
choose a homogeneous design (D = HOM) under which one department
contains the two underdogs and the other one the two favorites, or a het-
erogeneous design (D = HET ) which is characterized by two heterogeneous
departments each consisting of one underdog and one favorite.
In the following, there will be one tournament in each department.7 In the
given context of departmental tournaments, two workers i and j compete for
the monetary prizes wH and wL with wH > wL in each tournament. If qi > qj,
worker i will receive the high winner prize wH , whereas worker j will get the
loser prize wL. This paper departs from the standard tournament literature
by assuming that workers have perceived prizes which may differ from the
monetary tournament prizes wH and wL. In particular, we can imagine
that on the one hand a favorite feels anger or shame when losing against
an underdog. This would mean that a favorite’s subjectively perceived loser
prize under D = HET is lower than his monetary one, i.e. he gets wL − δ
in case of losing with δ > 0, whereas the underdog’s perceived loser prize is
(2003), for example. Alternatively, heterogeneity can be introduced via the workers’ cost
functions (or, very similar, by a multiplicative connection of effort and ability). Concerning
the tournament literature, the former modelling used in this paper refers to ”unfair”
contests, whereas the latter one leads to ”uneven” contests in the terminology of O’Keefe,
Viscusi and Zeckhauser (1984). This distinction and its implications will be discussed later
on in more details.
7This assumption rules out the possibility of one centralized tournament between all
four workers in order to allow the sorting of workers by the employer. For example, we can
assume that workers perform very different tasks in each tournament so that the outputs
of the two departments are not comparable.
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identical with his monetary one. On the other hand, an underdog might feel
joy or pride when winning against a favorite. This would imply that under
D = HET an underdog has a higher perceived winner prize wH + γ with
γ > 0 compared to his monetary one whereas the favorite’s perceived and
monetary winner prizes are the same. These two scenarios catch the typical
notion that often the subjective prize of a worker also depends on the strength
of his opponent.8 When winning (losing) against a mighty (weak) opponent
a worker realizes an extra utility (disutility) compared to a situation in which
he wins or loses against an equally able player. Hence, under D = HOM all
subjectively perceived prizes are identical to the monetary prizes.9
We assume that each worker wants to maximize expected (subjective)
wages minus effort costs. However, the employer’s objective function de-
pends on the given situation. We differentiate between a situation in which
tournament prizes are exogenously given (e.g., as the outcome of a bargain-
ing process between the union and the employer which is not modelled here)
and a situation where the employer endogenously chooses the optimal tour-
nament prizes. In the former case, the employer wants to maximize the sum
of the four efforts for given prizes and, therefore, for given labor costs. In the
latter case, he maximizes expected net profits, i.e. expected outputs minus
prizes.
The timing of the game is as follows: In the situation with exogenously
8For example, there are parallels to the status motive in competition; see, e.g., Frank
and Cook (1996), pp. 112-114.
9Note that the pure event of winning (losing) may lead to an extra utility (disutility) for
a worker even in the case of D = HOM . This will be the case, if workers have competitive
preferences in the sense of Fershtman et al. (2003a, 2003b). However, then all prizes are
subjectively perceived prizes which exceed the monetary ones. In this case, wH and wL
must be redefined, but the derived results will qualitatively remain the same.
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given prizes, we have to solve a two-stage game where, at the first stage,
the employer decides on the design of the firm, D. He can either choose
two homogeneous departments or fair tournaments (D = HOM) in which
two underdogs and two favorites compete against each other, respectively,
or two heterogeneous departments or unfair tournaments (D = HET ) each
consisting of an underdog and a favorite.10 Thereafter the four workers choose
their efforts ei at the second stage. However, there is a three-stage game in
the situation with endogenously chosen prizes: Again, at the first stage, the
employer chooses D. At the second stage he chooses the optimal tournament
prizes. At the third stage, for a given design D and given prizes the four
workers decide on their efforts.
3 On the Optimality of Unfair Tournaments
We begin the analysis by considering the simple case of fair tournaments.
Then we will consider the case in which only the favorite feels anger when
losing against an underdog in an unfair tournament. Finally, we will focus
on the case of pride within an unfair tournament.
3.1 Fair Tournaments
If the employer chooses D = HOM , we will have two fair tournaments in
the meaning of O’Keefe, Viscusi and Zeckhauser (1984) in which perceived
and monetary prizes are identical. In each of these tournaments the agents i
10O’Keefe, Viscusi and Zeckhauser (1984) introduced the notion of an ”unfair tourna-
ment” in which the favorite has a lead ∆a. For optimal seeding in a dynamic context see
Rosen (1986) and Groh et al. (2003).
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and j (i, j = t; t = U, F ) want to maximize
EUi(ei) = wL +∆w · prob{qi > qj}− c(ei)
= wL +∆w · F (ei − ej)− c(ei)
and
EUj(ej) = wL +∆w · [1− F (ei − ej)]− c(ej),
respectively, with ∆w = wH−wL. If an equilibrium in pure strategies exists,
it will be described by the following first-order conditions:11
∆wf (ei − ej) = c0(ei) and ∆wf (ei − ej) = c0(ej). (1)
Hence, we have a unique symmetric equilibrium (ei, ej) = (e∗, e∗) with
∆wf(0) = c0(e∗). (2)
3.2 Anger in Unfair Tournaments
In the case of two unfair tournaments (D = HET ) in which the favorite feels
anger when losing against an underdog whereas the underdog’s perceived
and monetary prizes are identical, the underdog’s first-order condition for
his optimal effort e∗U is given by
∆wf (e∗U − e∗F −∆a)− c0(e∗U) = 0, (3)
and the favorite’s one for e∗F by
α∆wf (e∗U − e∗F −∆a)− c0(e∗F ) = 0. (4)
11To guarantee existence, f(·) has to be sufficiently flat and c(·) sufficiently steep; see
Lazear and Rosen (1981), p. 845, Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983), for example. In the special
cases considered below, explicit conditions for existence will be given.
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with α∆w ≡ wH − (wL − δ) and α > 1. A comparison of (3) and (4) im-
mediately shows that a symmetric equilibrium no longer exists. Because of
α > 1, the favorite always exerts more effort than the underdog in equilib-
rium: e∗F > e
∗
U . Note that standard preferences with α = 1 would again lead
to a symmetric equilibrium now being described by
∆wf(−∆a) = c0(eˆ∗). (5)
The resulting effort eˆ∗ would be smaller than e∗ characterized by (2), since
f(·) has a unique mode at zero. The more unfair the tournament (i.e., the
higher ∆a), the smaller would be f(−∆a) and, therefore, the effort level eˆ∗.
However, according to (4) incentives will be (partly) restored for the fa-
vorite, if he feels anger from losing against his weaker opponent (i.e., α > 1).
Because of e∗F > e
∗
U we have e
∗
U − e∗F −∆a < 0. Hence, equilibrium efforts
according to (3) and (4) are determined by using the left-hand tail of the
density f (·) with f 0 (·) < 0 because of its unique mode at zero. Consider-
ing the system of equations (3) and (4), the general implicit-function rule
yields:12
∂e∗U
∂∆a
= −∆wf¯
0c00(eF )
|J | < 0 (6)
∂e∗F
∂∆a
= −α∆wf¯
0c00(e∗U)
|J | < 0 (7)
∂e∗U
∂α
= −∆w
2f¯ 0f¯
|J | < 0 (8)
∂e∗F
∂α
= −∆wf¯|J | ·
¡
∆wf¯ 0 − c00(e∗U
¢
)| {z }
< 0 due to SOCU
> 0 (9)
with f¯ := f (e∗U − e∗F −∆a) and
|J | = (∆wf¯ 0 − c00 (e∗U))| {z }
< 0 due to SOCU
(−α∆wf¯ 0 − c00 (e∗F ))| {z }
< 0 due to SOCF
+ α∆w2
£
f¯ 0
¤2
> 0
12”SOCt” denotes the second-order condition of the worker of type t ∈ {U,F}.
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as the Jacobian determinant. According to (6) and (7), increasing unfairness
in form of ∆a leads to decreasing incentives — as under standard preferences.
However, the comparison of (8) and (9) shows that ∂e
∗
F
∂α
>
¯¯¯
∂e∗U
∂α
¯¯¯
, i.e. we have
a net positive incentive effect from the favorite feeling anger when losing
against an underdog. In other words, the employer strictly gains from the
favorite’s disutility due to anger. Altogether, for given tournament prizes the
employer will prefer unfair (D = HET ) to fair tournaments (D = HOM), if
e∗U +e
∗
F > 2e
∗ where e∗ is described by (2). Note that e∗ is rather large — it is
always larger than e∗U — since the density f (·) has its peak at zero. However,
the effort e∗F may be larger than e
∗, if anger is strong enough. The findings
can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 1 Let tournament prizes be exogenously given. If α is suffi-
ciently large and ∆a sufficiently small, the employer will prefer D = HET
to D = HOM .
The results have shown that the employer benefits from emotions in
form of anger when organizing an unfair tournament. If these emotions
are strong enough, they will even dominate the incentive loss due to hetero-
geneity among the workers, and the employer will strictly prefer the design
D = HET .
In order to check, whether there exist feasible values for α and ∆a so that
unfair tournaments indeed dominate fair ones from the employer’s viewpoint,
consider the special case of quadratic costs c(ei) = c2e
2
i (with c > 0) and noise
εi being uniformly distributed over [−ε¯, ε¯]. The resulting convolution f(x)
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for εj − εi is triangular with13
f(x) =



1
2ε¯
+ x
4ε¯2
if −2ε¯ ≤ x ≤ 0
1
2ε¯
− x
4ε¯2
if 0 < x ≤ 2ε¯
0 otherwise.
as density function and
F (x) =



0 if x < −2ε¯
x
2ε¯
+ x
2
8ε¯2
+ 1
2
if − 2ε¯ ≤ x ≤ 0
x
2ε¯
− x2
8ε¯2
+ 1
2
if 0 < x ≤ 2ε¯
1 if x > 2ε¯
as corresponding distribution function. As additional assumptions let
∆w < 4cε¯2 and ∆a < 2ε¯.
The first assumption makes the agents’ objective functions strictly concave.
Without the second assumption, interior pure-strategy solutions cannot exist,
because exogenous noise is completely offset by the ability difference. In this
case, either the favorite would choose a preemptive effort or there would
be an equilibrium in mixed strategies analogously to the case of an all-pay
auction with full information. Simple calculations show that
e∗ =
∆w
2cε¯
, and (10)
e∗U =
∆w (2ε¯−∆a)
(α− 1)∆w + 4cε¯2 and e
∗
F =
α∆w (2ε¯−∆a)
(α− 1)∆w + 4cε¯2 . (11)
For given tournament prizes, the employer will prefer unfair to fair tour-
naments, if 2e∗ < e∗U + e
∗
F . By inserting for the three equilibrium efforts
according to (10) and (11) we obtain the following result:
13For construction of this convolution see analogously Kräkel (2000).
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Corollary 1 Let tournament prizes be exogenously given. For quadratic
costs and uniformly distributed noise, the employer will prefer D = HET to
D = HOM , iff
∆w < 2cε¯2 − 1 + α
α− 1∆acε¯. (12)
The corollary shows that there are feasible parameter constellations, for
which the employer strictly benefits from designing heterogeneous depart-
ments. In particular, according to condition (12) this preference is more
likely the larger the impact of anger (i.e., the higher α) and the smaller the
ability difference ∆a.
Now we can analyze the three-stage game in which the employer optimally
chooses wH and wL at the second stage. Here we can differentiate between
two subcases. On the one hand, tournament prizes may be chosen by the em-
ployer without restriction. In particular, the employer can choose arbitrarily
negative loser prizes to extract rents from the workers — in other words, he
demands an entrance fee of the workers. On the other hand, workers may
be characterized by limited liability so that the loser prize is restricted to
nonnegative values (wL ≥ 0). The following results can be obtained:
Proposition 2 Let tournament prizes be endogenously chosen by the em-
ployer. (i) Without restriction on wL, the employer strictly prefers D =
HOM to D = HET . (ii) If the loser prize is restricted to wL ≥ 0 (limited
liability) and the workers receive positive rents under D = HOM in equi-
librium, there will exist parameter values for δ and ∆a so that the employer
prefers D = HET to D = HOM .
Proof. See the appendix.
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If no restrictions are imposed on the loser prize (i.e., we have unlimited
liability), the employer is always better off by choosing two fair tournaments
(D = HOM) (result (i)). Under this design, equilibrium efforts are identical
functions of the prize spread so that the employer can implement first-best
efforts for both workers by using an appropriate value for ∆w. Unlimited
liability then ensures that the employer indeed wants to implement this solu-
tion, because he can choose an — arbitrarily negative — loser prize wL in order
to extract all rents from the workers. However, under D = HET symmet-
ric equilibria no longer exist at the tournament stage, and the employer is
only able to implement first-best effort for at most one worker. Moreover, the
worker with the higher expected utility receives a positive rent in equilibrium
i.e. full rent extraction is not possible for the employer under D = HET .
Finally, organizing two unfair tournaments unambiguously leads to a welfare
loss amounting to −δ in each department due to the favorite’s anger when
losing the tournament. Note that we assumed that the workers’ types are
common knowledge because otherwise the employer would not be able to
choose between D = HOM and D = HET . Theoretically the employer
could then choose two different pairs of prizes (wtL, w
t
H) (t = U, F ) in the
unfair tournament that depend on the type t of the winner and loser. Now
the employer would be able to implement first-best efforts for both workers
even under D = HET . However, the employer would still prefer D = HOM
because of the overall welfare loss −2δ under D = HET .14
If the loser prize wL has to be non-negative (limited liability), the compar-
14Moreover, the sum of winner and loser prize that are paid after the tournament are
typically different depending on whether the underdog or the favorite wins. However, then
the employer would always choose the lower sum of prizes ex post which could distort
ex ante incentives. In other words, unfair tournaments would lose their important self-
commitment properties that have been highlighted by Malcomson (1984).
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ison between the two tournament designs may end differently (result (ii)).
Given that workers earn positive rents that are sufficiently high and that
anger yields an incentive-enhancing effect as in Proposition 1, the employer
will prefer unfair tournaments to fair ones. The rents have to be high enough
to fully cover both the disutility −δ of feeling anger and the higher effort
costs imposed on the favorite. In this case, more effort is elicited from the
workers by the employer but the latter one does not pay for the extra incen-
tives because they only reduce the workers’ rents. Note that the lower the
workers’ reservation utilities the more likely workers will earn positive rents
under limited liability and — given positive rents — the higher are these rents.
In other words, low reservation utilities support the possible superiority of
unfair tournaments with emotional contestants.
To summarize, the results have shown that emotions in form of anger may
be beneficial for the employer although they directly lead to a welfare loss.
We found out two kinds of situations in which the employer benefits form
anger in unfair tournaments. The first situation assumes exogenously given
tournament prizes, the second one limited liability and sufficiently high rents
for workers. In both situations, the extra incentives induced by anger do not
lead to additional costs for the employer.
3.3 Pride in Unfair Tournaments
When considering an unfair tournament with an underdog who feels pride
after winning against a favorite, we have to modify the workers’ objective
functions under D = HET . Now the favorite’s perceived and monetary
prizes are identical, whereas the underdog has a higher perceived winner
prize wH +γ with γ > 0 which leads to a higher perceived prize spread β∆w
with β > 1 for the underdog. The two workers’ first-order conditions for
15
their optimal effort choices are now given by
β∆wf (e∗U − e∗F −∆a)− c0(e∗U) = 0 (13)
for the underdog, and
∆wf (e∗U − e∗F −∆a)− c0(e∗F ) = 0 (14)
for the favorite. Comparing (13) and (14) shows that again a symmetric
equilibrium does not exist. Because of β > 1, now the underdog always
exerts more effort than the favorite in equilibrium. However, now it is no
longer clear whether the left-hand side (e∗U − e∗F − ∆a < 0) or the right-
hand side (e∗U − e∗F − ∆a > 0) of the convolution f (·) becomes relevant in
equilibrium and, therefore, which type of worker has a higher probability
of winning. If the incentive effect outweighs the ability deficit ∆a of the
underdog (i.e., if e∗U > e
∗
F + ∆a), the underdog will have a higher winning
probability than the favorite, otherwise the opposite holds. By applying the
implicit-function rule to (13) and (14) we obtain — because of the shape of
f(·):15
∂e∗U
∂∆a
= −β∆wf¯
0c00(eF )
|J |



> 0, if e∗U > e
∗
F +∆a
< 0, if e∗U < e
∗
F +∆a
(15)
∂e∗F
∂∆a
= −∆wf¯
0c00(e∗U)
|J |



> 0, if e∗U > e
∗
F +∆a
< 0, if e∗U < e
∗
F +∆a
(16)
∂e∗U
∂β
= −∆wf¯|J |
¡
−∆wf¯ 0 − c00(e∗F
¢
)| {z }
< 0 due to SOCF
> 0 (17)
∂e∗F
∂β
=
∆w2f¯ 0f¯
|J |



< 0, if e∗U > e
∗
F +∆a
> 0, if e∗U < e
∗
F +∆a
(18)
15Again ”SOCt” denotes the second-order condition of the worker of type t ∈ {U,F}.
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with f¯ := f (e∗U − e∗F −∆a) and
|J | = (β∆wf¯ 0 − c00 (e∗U))| {z }
< 0 due to SOCU
(−∆wf¯ 0 − c00 (e∗F ))| {z }
< 0 due to SOCF
+ β∆w2
£
f¯ 0
¤2
> 0
as the Jacobian determinant. Hence, for both workers a higher ability differ-
ence ∆a has a motivating effect at the positive tail and a discouraging effect
at the negative tail of f(·). The motivating effect seems to be curious at first
sight, because incentives increase in the unfairness of the tournament which
is impossible under standard preferences. However, here a large value of β
implies an uneven situation e∗U > e
∗
F +∆a in favor of the underdog — we are
at the positive tail of f(·) — and in this situation an increase of ∆a leads
back to the mode of f(·) (i.e., it makes the tournament less uneven) where
incentives are maximal. Intuitively, here the additional incentives due to β
make the underdog exert a very high effort, but by an increase in the ability
difference the favorite would get back into the race. ∂e∗U/∂β > 0 shows that
the underdog’s incentives always increase in the motivating effect of beating
a predominant opponent. However, for the favorite the positive incentive ef-
fect only holds at the negative tail of f(·). Note that the net effect is always
positive since ∂e
∗
U
∂β
>
¯¯¯
∂e∗F
∂β
¯¯¯
.
These comparative statics are interesting for at least two reasons. First,
they give an explanation for the puzzling experimental findings of Weigelt
et al. (1989) and Schotter and Weigelt (1992). They conducted several ex-
periments on unfair tournaments and, according to their data, both types of
players significantly oversupply effort. Note that their theoretical benchmark
is given by eˆ∗ (see equation (5)), but by the impact of pride as modelled in
this paper we obtain e∗U > eˆ
∗ and e∗F > eˆ
∗ in the relevant range (i.e., at the
negative tail of f(·)) due to the stimulating effect of β. Second, we can derive
the principal’s optimal tournament design at the first stage:
17
Proposition 3 Let tournament prizes be exogenously given. If β is suffi-
ciently large and ∆a ∈ [e∗U − e∗F − η, e∗U − e∗F + η] with η > 0 being sufficiently
small, the employer will prefer D = HET to D = HOM . Otherwise, he
prefers D = HOM to D = HET .
Proof. The employer will prefer unfair to fair tournaments, if 2e∗U+2e
∗
F >
4e∗ where e∗ is given by equation (2), whereas the efforts e∗U and e
∗
F are
described by (13) and (14), respectively. The comparative statics have shown
that ∂e
∗
t
∂∆a > 0 (t = U,F ) for ∆a < e
∗
U − e∗F , and
∂e∗t
∂∆a < 0 for ∆a > e
∗
U − e∗F .
In both cases, in the limit ∆a → (e∗U − e∗F ) implies f¯ → f(0) and, hence,
e∗F → e∗ but — because of β > 1 — e∗U > e∗ (compare (2), (13) and (14)).
The proof of the proposition shows that if, in the unfair tournament,
the ability difference comes arbitrarily close to the difference of the equilib-
rium efforts, all three effort levels e∗, e∗U and e
∗
F will be determined by f(0).
However, since we have an extra incentive effect in unfair tournaments, the
underdogs will exert higher efforts than the competitors in the fair tourna-
ments and, therefore, unfair tournaments dominate fair ones. If, on the other
hand, ∆a and e∗U − e∗F clearly differ, e∗U − e∗F −∆a will tend to the tails of
f(·) so that f¯ becomes very small and the employer strictly prefers fair to
unfair tournaments.
Of course, the condition of subjectively perceived prizes (i.e., β > 1) is
necessary for unfair tournaments dominating fair ones. However, we can use
the framework of Weigelt et al. (1989) and Schotter and Weigelt (1992) —
quadratic costs, uniformly distributed noise — in order to show that there are
cases in which further restrictions on β are not necessary for the dominance
of unfair tournaments. Hence, as an example, consider again the case of
quadratic costs c(ei) = c2e
2
i (with c > 0) and noise εi being uniformly dis-
tributed over [−ε¯, ε¯]. The resulting convolution has been already described
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in Subsection 3.2. To guarantee existence of pure-strategy equilibria I as-
sume that (β − 1)∆w < 4cε¯2 (strict concavity) and ∆a < 2ε¯. The second
assumption ensures that existing noise is not completely offset by the ability
difference. Again, symmetric equilibrium efforts in the fair tournament, e∗,
are described by equation (10) but, by using (13), (14) and the assumptions
concerning the cost and the distribution function, equilibrium efforts in the
unfair tournament are now given by
e∗U =
β∆w (2ε¯+∆a)
(β − 1)∆w + 4cε¯2 and e
∗
F =
∆w (2ε¯+∆a)
(β − 1)∆w + 4cε¯2 (19)
if e∗U − e∗F > ∆a, and
e∗U =
β∆w (2ε¯−∆a)
4cε¯2 − (β − 1)∆w and e
∗
F =
∆w (2ε¯−∆a)
4cε¯2 − (β − 1)∆w (20)
if e∗U − e∗F < ∆a. Note that e∗U − e∗F > ∆a⇐⇒ ∆a <
(β−1)∆w
2cε¯
and e∗U − e∗F <
∆a ⇐⇒ ∆a > (β−1)∆w
2cε¯
. Calculating 2e∗U + 2e
∗
F > 4e
∗ for both cases yields
∆a >
(∆w−2cε¯2)(β−1)
(β+1)cε¯
=: ∆aˆL for e∗U − e∗F > ∆a, and ∆a <
(∆w+2cε¯2)(β−1)
(β+1)cε¯
=:
∆aˆH for e∗U−e∗F < ∆a, which do not contradict the two preceding conditions
for any β > 1.16 Hence, we obtain the following result:
Corollary 2 Let tournament prizes be exogenously given. For quadratic
costs and uniformly distributed noise, the employer will prefer D = HET to
D = HOM , iff ∆a ∈ [∆aˆL,∆aˆH ].
The corollary shows that, the employer will choose two unfair tourna-
ments as long as the ability difference lies inside a certain range. Solving
e∗U−e∗F = ∆a for the ability difference ∆a, with e∗U and e∗F being either given
by (19) or (20), leads to the middle of the interval [∆aˆL,∆aˆH ], which is given
by (β − 1)∆w/ (2cε¯). Here, the function e∗U + e∗F of ∆a has its maximum,
which confirms the findings of Proposition 3.
16Note that in each case e∗U − e∗F −∆a ∈ [−2ε¯, 2ε¯]. In addition, note that ∆aˆH < 2ε¯.
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In analogy to the case of anger, we can finally consider endogenous tourna-
ment prizes that are optimally chosen by the employer within the three-stage
game. Again we have to differentiate between unlimited liability (i.e., wL
can be arbitrarily negative) and limited liability (wL ≥ 0) of the workers.
Without restriction on the loser prize, under D = HOM again the employer
implements first-best effort for both workers and extracts all rents.17 Under
D = HET , as in the anger case, the employer is only able to induce first-
best incentives for at most one worker (e∗U 6= e∗F according to (13) and (14)),
and he has to leave a positive rent to the worker with the higher expected
utility. However, there is a crucial difference to the anger case. Under the
pride scenario, one of the workers — the underdog — receives an extra utility
γ with a certain probability. This expected extra utility relaxes the under-
dog’s participation constraint so that the employer is able to induce higher
incentives compared to fair tournaments. We can imagine that there exist
specifications for the cost function c (ei) and the distribution G (εi) for which
this incentive effect becomes dominant and the employer prefers D = HET
to D = HOM (see the proof of Proposition 4 in the appendix).
If we restrict the loser prize to non-negative values (limited liability) and
the workers earn sufficiently large rents, again D = HET may be beneficial
for the employer. The reasoning is the same as for the anger scenario: Pride
of the underdog leads to additional incentives for at least one of the workers,
and the net incentive effect for both workers is always positive (see equations
(17) and (18)). Hence, if the workers receive large rents under D = HOM ,
the employer can induce higher incentives to them under D = HET without
paying for the additional effort costs, since they only reduce the workers’
rents. Note that such situations are even more likely in the pride case than
17See the proof of Proposition 2.
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in the anger case since, with pride, the underdog receives the extra utility γ
whereas in the anger scenario the favorite suffers from an extra disutility δ.
Therefore, the positive rents have to cover δ as well as the additional effort
costs of the favorite who feels anger, but in the case in which the underdog
feels pride the additional effort costs are partly covered by the expected extra
utility γF (e∗U − e∗F −∆a). The findings can be summarized in the following
proposition:
Proposition 4 Let tournament prizes be endogenously chosen by the em-
ployer. (i) Under unlimited liability of the workers, there exist cost functions
c (ei) and distributions G (εi) for which the employer prefers D = HET to
D = HOM . (ii) If, under limited liability, the workers receive sufficiently
large rents under D = HOM in equilibrium, D = HET may dominate
D = HOM from the employer’s viewpoint.
Proof. See the appendix.
4 Discussion
The results above have shown that in unfair tournaments emotions as anger
and pride effect both overall welfare and the employer’s expected profits. The
effects on expected profits have been analyzed in detail: The comparative
statics have shown that the net effect of emotions on both workers’ efforts
is always positive. If emotions create additional incentives compared to fair
tournaments and if the employer need not pay for the enhanced incentives —
since (1) tournament prizes are exogenous or (2) the underdog’s participation
constraint is sufficiently relaxed by expected pride or (3) workers receive
sufficiently high rents —, the employer will benefit from emotional incentives
due to unfair tournaments. Consider, for example, an unfair tournament in
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which both the underdog and the favorite may feel emotions — the underdog
pride and the favorite anger. Then according to equations (4) and (13) the
workers’ first-order conditions are given by
(∆w + γ) f (e∗U − e∗F −∆a)− c0(e∗U) = 0 (21)
and (∆w + δ) f (e∗U − e∗F −∆a)− c0(e∗F ) = 0 (22)
with γ, δ > 0. If in this situation the employer need not pay for emotional
incentives, he will have the following preferences (see Propositions 1 and 3):
If γ > δ (i.e., e∗U > e
∗
F ), then γ and δ should be large and ∆a close to e
∗
U−e∗F .
If γ < δ (i.e., e∗U < e
∗
F ), then γ and δ should be large and close together,
whereas ∆a should be close to zero.
However, the welfare effects of emotions are not quite clear. For exam-
ple, if pride (anger) is extremely important so that the underdog (favorite)
realizes a very large extra utility (disutility) γ (−δ) in case of winning (los-
ing) the unfair tournament, then it will be always (never) efficient to choose
D = HET instead of D = HOM , since the workers’ monetary incomes and
the employer’s expected profits will only play a marginal role in this situa-
tion. If we restrict the welfare analysis to monetary values and do not count
emotional gains or losses, we will obtain a much clearer result. Recall from
equation (A3) from the proof of Proposition 2 that first-best effort eFB which
equalizes marginal revenue and marginal costs is implicitly described by
1 = c0
¡
eFB
¢
. (23)
Hence, monetary welfare is maximized when implementing effort eFB for both
workers. The proof of Proposition 2 has shown that under unlimited liability
first-best effort is always induced by the employer to both workers in a fair
tournament, whereas he cannot implement eFB for both workers in an unfair
one if workers feel either anger or pride. However, we can show that even
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under the most promising circumstances — (a) workers feel anger as well as
pride with γ = δ in equations (21) and (22), and (b) workers are characterized
by unlimited liability — the employer does not want to implement first-best
effort for both workers. Let EUt(e∗t ) denote the expected utility of the worker
of type t (= U,F ) in equilibrium. Then we obtain the following result:
Proposition 5 Let the employer choose prizes endogenously under unlimited
liability in an unfair tournament with both anger and pride. If both emotions
have the same impact (i.e., γ = δ in (21) and (22)), then we will have a
symmetric equilibrium e∗U = e
∗
F = e˜
∗ at the tournament stage with
e˜∗



> eFB, if EUF (e˜∗) = u¯
< eFB, if EUU(e˜∗) = u¯.
Proof. See the appendix.
Proposition 5 shows that ”symmetric emotions” allow for a symmetric
equilibrium at the tournament stage so that the employer is able to imple-
ment first-best efforts for both workers in an unfair tournament. However,
the employer will never do so. He either induces excessively high efforts so
that expected anger leads to a binding participation constraint for the fa-
vorite, or he chooses less than efficient effort so that expected pride makes
the underdog’s participation constraint bind. The intuition for this result is
the following: Note that in equilibrium each worker exerts effort according
to
(∆w + γ) f (−∆a) = c0(e˜∗).
Hence, the lower the ability difference, ∆a, and the higher the impact of
emotions, γ, the higher will be the effort level e˜∗.18 In the case of e˜∗ >
18Recall that the convolution f (·) has a unique mode at zero.
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eFB, the underdog’s expected utility must exceed the expected utility of the
favorite, i.e.
(∆w + γ)F (−∆a) > −γ + (∆w + γ) [1− F (−∆a)]⇔
γ >
µ
1
2F (−∆a) − 1
¶
∆w.
In other words, for an excessively high effort level the emotional influences
have to be sufficiently high and the ability difference sufficiently low.
The tournament considered here is modelled as a one-shot game. In a
dynamic setting (e.g., in a career-concerns framework), perhaps alternative
interpretations can be given for γ and δ. From a dynamic perspective, both
parameters may be interpreted as reputation effects if the labor market is
uncertain about the true abilities of the workers. Then if a presumable
favorite loses against a presumable underdog, the former one will realize
an extra disutility because the labor market adjusts its ability expectations
downward whereas the latter one receives an extra utility due to Bayesian
updating. Of course, the model considered in this paper is static with abilities
being common knowledge and ignores aspects of career concerns, but there
are dynamic tournament models which particularly focus on these aspects
(see Zabojnik and Bernhardt 2001, Koch and Peyrache 2003).
As mentioned above the distinction between fair and unfair tournaments
was introduced in the literature by O’Keefe et al. (1984). We can also apply
the concept of emotions and subjectively perceived prizes to ”uneven tour-
naments” in the terminology of O’Keefe et al. In those tournaments, again a
favorite competes against an underdog, but now the underdog is character-
ized by a steeper cost function compared to the favorite. The experimental
findings of Bull et al. (1987) and Schotter and Weigelt (1992) on uneven
tournaments show that only the underdogs exert significantly more effort
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than theoretically predicted. The concept introduced in this paper can ex-
plain these findings: If pride leads to additional incentives, the underdog will
always choose more than the equilibrium effort of a worker with standard
preferences. If the impact of pride is (a) larger than that of anger and (b)
sufficiently high to compensate for the steeper cost function, the underdog
may even choose higher effort than the favorite.
Finally, the concept of emotions can be applied to individualistic in-
centive schemes like bonuses or piece rates (Kräkel 2004). Under these
schemes, workers are compensated independently, but either a worker feels
joy/frustration when meeting/non-meeting a certain target, or the pure ex-
istence of co-workers and their success may influence the behavior of other
workers at the same workplace (peer effects). The findings in Kräkel (2004)
show that the tournament results in a similar way also hold for bonuses and
piece rates although workers are solely compensated according to individual
output. The intuition for the similarity can be explained by the fact that
emotions make workers care for their co-workers so that there will be a com-
pensation game between the workers. Interestingly, if anger and pride have
a different impact, the employer will never implement first-best incentives
under piece rates any longer despite risk neutrality and unlimited liability
of the workers. Instead he always prefers to utilize the compensation game
between the workers in order to elicit extra effort from them. The field exper-
iments by Falk and Ichino (2003) empirically support the existence of such
peer effects: In their experiments, subjects either have to work alone (sin-
gle treatment) or as pairs consisting of two subjects (pair treatment). Each
subject earns a fixed payment. The empirical findings show that the average
output in the pair treatment significantly exceeds the output in the single
treatment. Hence, observing the performance of co-workers leads to positive
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peer effects that raise overall productivity.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduce a concept of emotions into the theory of rank-
order tournaments. We analyze the impact of emotions on both the workers’
incentives and the employer’s profits. It can be shown that the net effect
of anger and pride on the two workers’ efforts is always positive. Further-
more, the employer will benefit from emotional incentives and, hence, from
organizing an unfair tournament if he need not directly pay for the enhanced
incentives, i.e. if tournament prizes are exogenous or the workers’ participa-
tion constraints are sufficiently relaxed by expected pride or workers receive
sufficiently high rents.
The concept of emotions used in this paper has a special focus. Here,
we have concentrated on emotions that emerge when comparing one’s own
performance with the performance of heterogeneous co-workers. By this, the
interplay of emotions and incentives can be analyzed in detail. Moreover,
results can be derived concerning the optimal design of departments and the
optimality of unfair tournaments from the employer’s viewpoint. Finally, the
concept is used in order to explain experimental findings on the oversupply
of effort in tournaments which contradict standard economic theory.
The analysis of emotions can be extended in several directions. For exam-
ple, this paper considers the impact of emotions on incentives. Perhaps, there
are also matching effects concerning different types of workers with different
emotional attitudes. Considering such weak factors like the ”chemistry” be-
tween co-workers may be important when deciding about the composition of
departments and work groups. As another example, it may be interesting
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to discuss emotions in a dynamic setting. Over time there may be reinforce-
ment effects concerning such emotions like anger or frustration and, hence,
the existence of certain threshold levels may be decisive for workers’ actions.
Furthermore, in a dynamic context evolutionary aspects concerning the emer-
gence or disappearance of certain emotional attitudes in work groups can be
analyzed.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2:
(i) In the case of two fair tournaments (D = HOM), for each department
the employer chooses tournament prizes in order to maximize
π = 2e∗ (∆w) + 2at −∆w − 2wL (t = U,F ) (A1)
subject to the workers’ individual participation constraint
∆w + 2wL
2
− c (e∗ (∆w)) ≥ u¯ (A2)
with e∗ (∆w) being described by the incentive constraint (2). Note that
first-best effort eFB is defined by
eFB = argmax
et
{qt − c (et)} (t = U,F ),
which leads to
1 = c0
¡
eFB
¢
. (A3)
Since the loser prize wL decreases the employer’s objective function, he
chooses wL so that (A2) is binding, i.e. the employer extracts all rents from
the workers and wants to maximize overall welfare by implementing first-best
efforts. Hence, the employer chooses
wH = c
¡
eFB
¢
+ u¯+
1
2f(0)
and wL = c
¡
eFB
¢
+ u¯− 1
2f(0)
.
In an unfair tournament (D = HET ), the employer wants to maximize
π = e∗U (∆w) + e
∗
F (∆w) + aU + aF −∆w − 2wL (A4)
subject to the workers’ participation constraints
wL +∆wF (e
∗
U (∆w)− e∗F (∆w)−∆a)− c (e∗U (∆w)) ≥ u¯(A5)
wL − δ + (∆w + δ) [1− F (e∗U (∆w)− e∗F (∆w)−∆a)]− c (e∗F (∆w)) ≥ u¯(A6)
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with e∗U (∆w) and e
∗
F (∆w) being implicitly defined by (3) and (4). To save
labor costs, the employer chooses wL to make the participation constraint of
the worker with the lower expected utility just bind, whereas the other worker
receives a positive rent. However, recall that e∗F (∆w) > e
∗
U (∆w) which im-
plies F (e∗U (∆w)− e∗F (∆w)−∆a) < 0.5 but also c (e∗F (∆w)) > c (e∗U (∆w)).
Hence without further specifying the distribution and the cost function it is
not clear whether the left-hand side of (A5) is larger than the left-hand side
of (A6) or vice versa. Anyway, since the incentive-enhancing effect of δ is
irrelevant here — incentives can be continuously adjusted by appropriately
choosing ∆w, whereas wL solely serves for transferring wealth between the
employer and the workers —, disutility δ yields a welfare loss, and the em-
ployer cannot implement eFB for both workers, D = HOM unambiguously
dominates D = HET from the employer’s viewpoint.
(ii) As a starting point look at the participation constraint (A2) under
D = HOM and let (A2) be non-binding in equilibrium, i.e. workers earn
positive rents. If we now switch to D = HET with ∆a being arbitrarily
close to zero and with δ fulfilling e∗U + e
∗
F > 2e
∗ for given tournament prizes
according to Proposition 1, then the employer may prefer D = HET to
D = HOM : Overall efforts are higher in the unfair tournament but the
employer does not have to pay for the large effort costs, c (e∗F (∆w)), which
only reduce agent F ’s rent. Of course, according to (A6) the workers’ rents
have to be sufficiently large so that they are still positive after the switch
to D = HET despite the additional disutility δ and the higher effort costs
c (e∗F (∆w)).
In order to illustrate that such scenarios indeed exist for feasible values
of δ and ∆a, consider the following example: Let again εi (i = A,B) be
uniformly distributed over [−ε¯, ε¯]. Effort costs are described by c (ei) = c3e3i .
29
Let, for simplicity, c = ε¯ = δ = 1, ∆a = 0.1 and u¯ = 0. Hence, we
can use the triangular convolution above with range [−2, 2] and f (0) =
1
2ε¯
= 1
2
. According to (A3), first-best effort is given by eFB = 1, and the
optimal loser prize wL for implementing eFB under D = HOM by wL =
1
3
(1)3 − 2·1
2
= 1
3
− 1 < 0 , which is not feasible under limited liability. The
optimal solution underD = HOM can be calculated as follows: The workers’
incentive constraint (2) simplifies to
e∗ =
r
∆w
2
.
Hence, the employer wants to maximize
πHOM = 2
r
∆w
2
+ 2at −∆w − 2wL (t = U,F )
subject to
∆w + 2wL
2
− 1
3
Ãr
∆w
2
!3
≥ 0 and wL ≥ 0.
The employer optimally chooses ∆w∗ = 1
2
and w∗L = 0 which yields overall
profits 2π∗HOM = 1 + 2aL + 2aH from both fair tournaments, whereas each
worker receives a positive rent 5
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= 0.20833.
Under D = HET , we know from (3) and (4) and the left-hand side of
the triangular convolution that workers behave according to
∆w
µ
1
2
+
e∗U − e∗F − 0.1
4
¶
= e∗2U (A7)
and (∆w + δ)
µ
1
2
+
e∗U − e∗F − 0.1
4
¶
= e∗2F (A8)
which implies
e∗F =
r
∆w + δ
∆w
e∗U .
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Inserting into the first-order condition (A7) and solving for e∗U gives
e∗U =
1
40
³
5∆wΩ+
p
50∆w2Ω+ (25δ + 760)∆w
´
=
1
40
³
5∆wΩ+
√
50∆w2Ω+ 785∆w
´
e∗F =
1
40
r
∆w + 1
∆w
³
5∆wΩ+
√
50∆w2Ω+ 785∆w
´
with Ω :=
³
1−
q
∆w+δ
∆w
´
=
³
1−
q
∆w+1
∆w
´
. The employer’s expected profits
for organizing an unfair tournament are
πHET = e∗U + e
∗
F + aL + aH −∆w − 2wL
=
Ã
1 +
r
∆w + 1
∆w
!
e∗U + aL + aH −∆w − 2wL
=
Ã
1 +
r
∆w + 1
∆w
!
1
40
³
5∆wΩ+
√
50∆w2Ω+ 785∆w
´
+aL + aH −∆w − 2wL.
The workers’ expected utilities can be written as
EUU (e
∗
U) = wL +∆w
Ã
(Ωe∗U − 0.1)
2
+
(Ωe∗U − 0.1)
2
8
+
1
2
!
− 1
3
e∗3U
and
EUF (e
∗
F ) = (∆w + 1)
Ã
1−
Ã
(Ωe∗U − 0.1)
2
+
(Ωe∗U − 0.1)
2
8
+
1
2
!!
+wL − 1−
1
3
Ãr
∆w + 1
∆w
e∗U
!3
.
Plotting πHET , EUU and EUF as functions of ∆w with aL = aH = 0 gives
the following figure:
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(independent variable at the abscissa: ∆w; solid thin line: πHET
under wL = 0; dashed line: EUU under wL = 0; dotted line: EUF
under wL = 0; solid bold line: πHET under EUF = 0)
Note that all but the solid bold line hold for wL = 0. Since the ob-
jective functions (function) of both workers (the employer) strictly increase
(decreases) in wL, only values between the maximum of the πHET graph
(= solid thin line) and the intersection between the EUF graph (= dot-
ted line) and the abscissa are relevant for the optimal ∆w. Note also that
EUU (e
∗
U) > EUF (e
∗
F ) in the relevant parameter range for ∆w. Hence, the
employer chooses ∆w and wL to maximize πHET subject to EUF ≥ 0 and
wL ≥ 0. Since πHET strictly decreases in wL but both restrictions, EUF ≥ 0
and wL ≥ 0, relax with increasing wL, at least one of the two constraints
is binding in equilibrium. In the figure above with wL = 0, the employer
would choose ∆w so that EUF just intersects the abscissa. This happens at
∆w = 0.78525 where the employer receives profits πHET = 0.62644+aL+aH .
If otherwise wL > 0, the employer would choose wL to make the favorite’s
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participation constraint just bind which implies
w∗L = 1 +
1
3
Ãr
∆w + 1
∆w
e∗U
!3
− (∆w + 1)
Ã
1−
Ã
(Ωe∗U − 0.1)
2
+
(Ωe∗U − 0.1)
2
8
+
1
2
!!
.
When inserting into πHET we obtain
πHET =
Ã
1 +
r
∆w + 1
∆w
!
e∗U −
2
3
Ãr
∆w + 1
∆w
e∗U
!3
+aL + aH − 1− 2 (∆w + 1)
Ã
(Ωe∗U − 0.1)
2
+
(Ωe∗U − 0.1)
2
8
!
.
which is described by the solid bold line in the figure above. We can easily
see that in this case the employer would choose the corner solution ∆w =
0.78525. Altogether, when organizing two unfair tournaments the employer’s
overall profits are 2π∗HET = 1.2529 + 2aL + 2aH > 2π
∗
HOM = 1 + 2aL + 2aH .
Proof of Proposition 4:
Since result (ii) proceeds analogously to result (ii) of Proposition 2, it
remains to show that under unlimited liability of the workers there exist
cost functions c (ei) and distributions G (εi) for which the employer prefers
D = HET to D = HOM . The employer’s optimization problem can be
characterized by the Lagrangian
L (eU , eF ,∆w,wL) = eU + eF + aU + aF −∆w − 2wL
+λ1 · [(∆w + γ) f (eU − eF −∆a)− c0(eU)]
+λ2 · [∆wf (eU − eF −∆a)− c0(eF )]
+λ3 · [wL + (∆w + γ)F (eU − eF −∆a)− c (eU)− u¯]
+λ4 · [wL +∆w [1− F (eU − eF −∆a)]− c (eF )− u¯]
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with λ1,λ2 ≥ 0 as multipliers for the workers’ incentive constraints (13) and
(14), and λ3,λ4 ≥ 0 as multipliers for the workers’ participation constraints.
In optimum, we must have that
∂L
∂eU
= 1 + λ1
£
(∆w + γ) f¯ 0 − c00(eU)
¤
+ λ2∆wf¯ 0 (A9)
+λ3
£
(∆w + γ) f¯ − c0 (eU)
¤
− λ4∆wf¯ = 0
∂L
∂eF
= 1− λ1 (∆w + γ) f¯ 0 + λ2
£
−∆wf¯ 0 − c00(eF )
¤
(A10)
−λ3 (∆w + γ) f¯ + λ4
£
∆wf¯ − c0 (eF )
¤
= 0
∂L
∂∆w
= −1 + (λ1 + λ2) f¯ + (λ3 − λ4) F¯ + λ4 = 0 (A11)
∂L
∂wL
= −2 + λ3 + λ4 = 0 (A12)
with f¯ := f (eU − eF −∆a) and F¯ := F (eU − eF −∆a). Condition (A12)
shows that at least one participation constraint is binding in equilibrium.
Typically, exactly one participation constraint will be binding: Since the
loser prize wL only serves to transfer wealth between the employer and the
workers and because this prize can be arbitrarily negative, the employer
chooses it so that the worker with the lower expected utility just receives u¯
in expected terms. Combining (A9) and (A10) gives
2− λ1c00(eU)− λ2c00(eF )− λ3c0 (eU)− λ4c0 (eF ) = 0. (A13)
The two incentive constraints together yield
c0(eU)
∆w + γ
=
c0(eF )
∆w
. (A14)
Of course, without further specifying the cost function and the probability
distribution no clear results can be derived. Hence, Proposition 4(i) only
claims that for certain specifications the employer prefers D = HET to
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D = HOM . Consider, for example, the case of quadratic costs c (ei) = c2e
2
i
and uniformly distributed noise εi ∈ [−ε¯, ε¯] so that εj − εi is triangularly
distributed — as in the Corollaries 1 and 2. In order to guarantee a strictly
concave objective function for both workers and the existence of pure-strategy
equilibria, let
∆w + γ < 4cε¯2 (A15)
and
∆a < 2ε¯. (A16)
Furthermore, let the favorite’s participation constraint be binding so that we
have λ3 = 0 and λ4 = 2 (see (A12)). In this case, (A13) can be rewritten as
λ1 + λ2 =
2
c
− 2eF .
Inserting into (A11) (together with λ3 = 0 and λ4 = 2) leads toµ
2
c
− 2eF
¶
f (eU − eF −∆a)− 2F (eU − eF −∆a) + 1 = 0.
By substituting for the triangular distribution and assuming eU−eF−∆a < 0
(hence, later on we have to check whether this condition indeed holds) we
can rearrange the last condition toµ
4ε¯
c
− 4ε¯eF
¶
+
µ
2
c
− 2eF − 4ε
¶
(eU − eF −∆a)− (eU − eF −∆a)2 = 0.
(A17)
For quadratic costs, (A14) simplifies to
eU
(∆w + γ)
=
eF
∆w
(A18)
and the favorite’s participation constraint to
∆w
µ
1
2ε¯
+
eU − eF −∆a
4ε¯2
¶
= ceF . (A19)
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Solving the system of equations (A17)—(A19) for eU , eF and ∆w yields
e∗U =
γ2 + 4cε¯2 (c∆a (4ε¯−∆a) + 2 (2ε¯−∆a))− 2γ (2ε¯−∆a)− 2γc∆a (4ε¯−∆a)
2c (4cε¯2 − γ) (2ε¯−∆a)
e∗F =
γ2 + 4cε¯2 (c∆a (4ε¯−∆a) + 2 (2ε¯−∆a))− 2γ (2ε¯−∆a)− 8cε¯2γ
2c (4cε¯2 − γ) (2ε¯−∆a)
∆w∗ =
γ2 + 4cε¯2 (c∆a (4ε¯−∆a) + 2 (2ε¯−∆a))− 2γ (2ε¯−∆a)− 8cε¯2γ
2c (2ε¯−∆a)2
.
At last, the favorite’s binding participation constraint
wL +∆w [1− F (e∗U − e∗F −∆a)]−
c
2
e∗2F = u¯
leads to the optimal loser prize
w∗L = u¯−
¡
2γ (2ε¯−∆a) + 3γ
¡
γ − 8cε¯2
¢
+ 4cε¯2
¡
8cε¯2 + c∆a (4ε¯−∆a) + 2 (∆a− 2ε¯)
¢¢×
γ2 + 4cε¯2 (c∆a (4ε¯−∆a) + 2 (2ε¯−∆a))− 2γ (2ε¯−∆a)− 8cε¯2γ
8c (4cε¯2 − γ)2 (2ε¯−∆a)2
.
The employer’s expected profits from organizing an unfair tournament are,
therefore,
πHET = e∗U + e
∗
F + aU + aF −∆w∗ − 2w∗L
= aU + aF − 2w∗L
+
γ (8cε¯2 − γ)− 2 (c∆a (4ε¯−∆a) + 2 (2ε¯−∆a)) ((cε¯− 1) 2ε¯+∆a)
2c (2ε¯−∆a)2
= aU + aF − 2u¯
+
γ (8cε¯2 − γ)− 2 (c∆a (4ε¯−∆a) + 2 (2ε¯−∆a)) ((cε¯− 1) 2ε¯+∆a)
2c (2ε¯−∆a)2
+
¡
2γ (2ε¯−∆a) + 3γ
¡
γ − 8cε¯2
¢
+ 4cε¯2
¡
8cε¯2 + c∆a (4ε¯−∆a) + 2 (∆a− 2ε¯)
¢¢×
γ2 + 4cε¯2 (c∆a (4ε¯−∆a) + 2 (2ε¯−∆a))− 2γ (2ε¯−∆a)− 8cε¯2γ
4c (4cε¯2 − γ)2 (2ε¯−∆a)2
However, when organizing a fair tournament the employer’s expected profits
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amount to
πHOM = 2eFB − 2c
¡
eFB
¢
+ aU + aF − 2u¯
=
2
c
− 2 c
2
µ
1
c
¶2
+ aU + aF − 2u¯
=
1
c
+ aU + aF − 2u¯.
The comparison
γ (8cε¯2 − γ)− 2 (c∆a (4ε¯−∆a) + 2 (2ε¯−∆a)) ((cε¯− 1) 2ε¯+∆a)
2c (2ε¯−∆a)2
+
¡
2γ (2ε¯−∆a) + 3γ
¡
γ − 8cε¯2
¢
+ 4cε¯2
¡
8cε¯2 + c∆a (4ε¯−∆a) + 2 (∆a− 2ε¯)
¢¢×
γ2 + 4cε¯2 (c∆a (4ε¯−∆a) + 2 (2ε¯−∆a))− 2γ (2ε¯−∆a)− 8cε¯2γ
4c (4cε¯2 − γ)2 (2ε¯−∆a)2
>
1
c
.
can be simplified to
γ4 − 4γ3 (2ε¯ (2cε¯+ 1)−∆a) + 4cγ2
¡
8ε¯2 + 4∆aε¯−∆a2
¢
(2ε¯ (cε¯+ 1)−∆a)
−32ε¯2γc2
¡
2∆aε¯2 (4cε¯+ 3)− 2ε¯∆a2 (3 + cε¯) +∆a3 + 4ε¯3
¢
+16∆ac3ε¯4 (4ε¯−∆a) (4ε¯ (c∆a+ 2)−∆a (c∆a+ 4)) > 0. (A20)
According to Proposition 4(i), we have only to show that inequality (A20)
holds for at least one feasible parameter constellation. It can easily be checked
that c = ε¯ = 1 and ∆a = γ = 0.5 satisfy (A20). Moreover, we obtain
e∗F = 1.3095 > 1 = e
FB
e∗U = 1.5238 > 1 = e
FB
so that (A15), (A16) and e∗U − e∗F − ∆a < 0 hold. Hence, under the given
specifications it is optimal for the employer to induce higher than first-best
efforts to both workers.
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Proof of Proposition 5:
Suppose we have γ = δ in (21) and (22). This yields a symmetric solution
for the tournament stage, e˜∗ = e˜∗ (∆w), implicitly defined by
(∆w + γ) f (−∆a) = c0(e˜∗).
The employer’s Lagrangian at the second stage of the three-stage game (with
D = HET at the first stage) can be written as
L(∆w,wL) = 2e˜
∗ (∆w) + aU + aF −∆w − 2wL
+λ1[wL + (∆w + γ)F (−∆a)− c (e˜∗ (∆w))− u¯]
+λ2[wL − γ + (∆w + γ) [1− F (−∆a)]− c (e˜∗ (∆w))− u¯]
with λ1,λ2 ≥ 0 as multipliers. In optimum, we must have
∂L
∂∆w
= 2
∂e˜∗
∂∆w
− 1 + λ1F (−∆a)− λ1c0 (e˜∗)
∂e˜∗
∂∆w
+λ2[1− F (−∆a)]− λ2c0 (e˜∗)
∂e˜∗
∂∆w
= 0 (A21)
and
∂L
∂wL
= −2 + λ1 + λ2 = 0. (A22)
Hence, according to (A22) at least one participation constraint is binding in
equilibrium. In general, we have (∆w + γ)F (−∆a) 6= −γ + (∆w + γ) [1 −
F (−∆a)] and the employer chooses wL to make the participation constraint
of the worker with the lower expected utility bind. If, therefore, λ1 = 0 and
λ2 = 2, equation (A21) yields
2
∂e˜∗
∂∆w
(1− c0 (e˜∗)) + 1− 2F (−∆a) = 0.
Since F (−∆a) < 1
2
because of the symmetry of the convolution, we must
have c0 (e˜∗) > 1. Comparing with (A3) gives e˜∗ > eFB because marginal costs
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are strictly increasing due to the convexity of the cost function. If, however,
λ1 = 2 and λ2 = 0, equation (A21) leads to
2
∂e˜∗
∂∆w
(1− c0 (e˜∗))− 1 + 2F (−∆a) = 0
and, hence, to e˜∗ < eFB.
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